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Evolutionary continuity of personhood
Commentary on Rowlands on Animal Personhood
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Psychology and Philosophy, Cerro Coso College, California
Abstract: Rowlands applies the two organizing ideas of the Lockean concept of personhood —
mental life and unity — to animals as potential persons. Especially valuable in this context is his
descriptive phenomenology of pre-reflective self-awareness as a fundamental form of mental life
that necessarily entails unity. Rowland describes certain fundamentals of mental experience that
exist across species boundaries, challenging assumptions of early modern philosophers regarding
the definition of human personhood and affirming the principle of evolutionary continuity. This
opens the door to a broader and deeper set of questions, related to whether we should continue
to attempt to apply to other animals — or to ourselves — philosophical models that are ancient
and revered but contradicted in significant measure by contemporary scientific findings,
especially in evolutionary biology.
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1. Philosophical Models of Personhood. Rowlands (2016) begins his target article by noting
that concepts of personhood are variously defined as legal, moral, and metaphysical. He
addresses the metaphysical specifically as defined by Locke. Pragmatically speaking, the legal
case for animal personhood is advancing in the absence of metaphysical foundation — case by
case, as the sciences shape our understanding of other animals and as real life situations make
moral demands upon us for remediation (Benvenuti, 2016).
Rowlands produces a convincing metaphysics of personhood satisfying the requirements
of the Western philosophical tradition, particularly as advanced by Locke. We must remain
aware of the distinction between satisfying the requirements of Western metaphysics as a
human cultural artifact and making a true declaration about reality. The Western philosophical
tradition has placed high value on the human capacity for rational abstraction. I (Benvenuti,
2014, 2016) have repeatedly argued that this evaluation of our capacity for rational abstraction
— especially as contrasted with affective awareness — lacks merit. Human cognition has
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repeatedly been demonstrated to be largely unconscious, fundamentally affective, and
fragmentary, and not the accurate rational perception of early modern philosophers’ dreams.
Rowlands notes that many people adopt Locke’s concept of personhood, knowingly or
unknowingly: The Lockean concept is a big assumption, especially given its roots in Aristotle’s
(problematic) ontology of beings. The Aristotelian ontology that pervades Western metaphysics
deserves reexamination, particularly its notion of human distinctness from and superiority to
other animals because of our capacity for abstract thought. Aristotle asserted that all animals
share fundamental affective awareness motivated towards experiences that enhance the self
and away from experiences that would diminish the self. That, combined with the capacity to
move towards and away from experiences, is his definition of animal life. This is quite similar to
the pre-reflective awareness described by Rowlands. Aristotle further observed that other
animals are incapable of the kind of thinking that allows the mind to move beyond the limits of
time and space within which the body is confined. The problem-solving capacity of animals, now
well documented, suggests that Aristotle was mistaken. What Rowlands laudably accomplishes
with his analysis of Lockean personhood is the detachment of self-awareness and unity from
Aristotle’s notion of abstract thought and its modern derivative, “higher order” cognition, by
developing the category of pre-reflective self-awareness.
2. Evolutionary Continuity and Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness. Rowlands does much more than
satisfy the requirements of Lockean personhood for mental experience and unity. His detailed
analysis of awareness as self-awareness is reminiscent of Abram’s (2011) narrative in Becoming
Animal. As animals, we move through a world, knowing it in relation to our particular sensual
bodies, motivated to encounter certain things and to avoid others. In other words, our animal
bodies determine the shape of the world we encounter: we cannot encounter objects in the
world without encountering the self in the same experience. Pre-reflective self-awareness as
described and analyzed by Rowlands (after Sartre, 1943) may well be the definition of animal
life, including human-animal life.
The principle of evolutionary continuity is based on the evidence that all life descends
from a common ancestor, with modifications that enhance adaptation to environmental niches.
It follows that all life shares some features, that all animals share a subset of the features of all
life, and so forth. Studies of the mammalian brain show primary affective motivational states
that cross species boundaries, including an awareness of objects in the world and an embodied
readiness to act that is so close to the self/other awareness boundary that these affective
experiences might be thought of as the very awakening of consciousness (Panksepp & Biven,
2012). These primary affects are remarkably similar to Rowlands’s description of pre-reflective
awareness, particularly to affordances as “perception for action,” in which self-awareness is the
subjective sense of being oneself and not the more reflective capacity to view oneself as an
object of one’s own concern. The first type of self-awareness falls into Shoemaker’s (1968)
category of “immune to error through misidentification,” as analyzed by Rowlands: it is possible
to doubt that I am correctly seeing my shadow or my image in a reflective surface, but it is not
possible to doubt irreducible feeling states. Rowlands makes the strong case that there is a
severe logical problem in the idea that we validate self-awareness by moving to greater levels of
abstraction, making a distant object of the self. Rather, self-awareness can only be the self of
direct experience, the kind of self that we share with other animals.
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On the basis of the principle of evolutionary continuity, we would expect that large
categories of experience, such as fundamental motivations, developmental trajectories,
communication, and mental life (including fundamental self-awareness) would be shared across
species. It is more reasonable to reject ontologies founded in imaginary hierarchical
constructions and to conclude that all animals think, feel, intend, and communicate than to
assume that they do not. In a similar way, it is more reasonable to expect that animals would
share some features of personhood than to doubt a priori that they could do so.
Animal personhood does not mean human personhood in other species. It means that
there are probably many forms of expression of person-like features among animal species.
These variations are not indicators of lesser personhood but of variance in how personhood is
experienced and expressed. Defining animal life in comparison to features of human life makes
us devalue animal traits unlike our own, but it prevents us from perceiving the ways a general
trait, such as mind or feeling, might exist in other animals.
We can ask how each kind of animal experiences its own self. Rowlands has described
the phenomenology of pre-reflective awareness determined by an animal’s particular body and
sensory apparatus and by its particular needs and desires for in its world of objects. Not all
species are highly visual, as is required for Gallup’s (1970) mirror self-recognition test: We would
not expect cephalopods, who know the world by taste, to recognize a dot placed on their
forehead. We would not expect this from dogs. Bekoff (2001) developed a scent-based pilot
study using urine to test dog self-awareness. Rowlands’s pre-reflective awareness might yield
fundamental and shared self-awareness in any kind of body that encounters the world through
senses related to motivational states.
3. Human Unconsciousness: The (Human) Psychological Factor. Whereas humans share prereflective self-awareness with other animals, we have an unusual capacity to override basic
awareness, especially via our commitment to abstract ideas that color our perceptions and
disguise our motivations. Our capacity for abstract thought allows us to distance ourselves from
fundamental motives, all the more so when affect is derided as subhuman. When Descartes
(1637) said that animals do not feel pain when they cry out, but that they are, in that cry, acting
like a mechanical alarm indicating malfunction, he was using the kind of abstract reasoning,
“purified” of affective passions, that has since been held up as the pinnacle of cognitive
capacity. Yet Descartes’s proposition is one that most people today find both wrong and morally
offensive. Upon hearing it, they make a “disgust face” — that shared feature of animal life that
expresses moral repugnance (Bekoff & Pierce, 2009, Churchland, 2011). Descartes’s affective
motivations led him to use abstract thought in a morally convenient and empirically incorrect
manner that defies what most of us would call common sense. I do not wish to promote some
vague idea of “common sense” over empirical evidence; but there is a rich literature on the
“common sense” of body-to-body affective communication by which we know the state of the
other implicitly to varying degrees of accuracy, and by which we know that when an animal
howls in pain, it feels pain. There is a hint of the deep tragedy of human unconsciousness in the
image of Descartes going around with his own companion dog and still insisting that animals are
machines.
We Homo sapiens use our capacity for abstract thought to override our pre-reflective
self-awareness. This results in beliefs that contradict our pre-reflective awareness and are
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demonstrably contrary to fact. The principle of evolutionary continuity is supported by an
abundance of empirical evidence suggesting that personhood is a broadly distributed trait.
Rowlands has shown how such evolutionary continuity could still satisfy Locke’s philosophical
criteria, concluding that “hostility to the idea of animals being persons derives from the Lockean
conception of the person, and the idea that self-awareness is necessary for personhood.”
It is worth noting the persistence of certain philosophical notions even when
contradicted by the evidence. I have described three: the Aristotelian notion that humans are
distinct from and superior to other animals because of our capacity for abstract thought; the
Cartesian notion that affective “passions” interfere with thought, rather than informing it; and
the Lockean notion that only humans have the rational self-awareness required for personhood.
Philosophical hostility to the idea of animal personhood may in fact derive from human
psychological motives to consider ourselves distinct from and superior to other animals — to be
authorized to use other animals de facto, and to avoid painful feelings of empathy for their
suffering. We may find not only greater truthfulness but also a richer capacity to conceptualize
ways of being persons when we extend our ideas of personhood to our non-human relatives.
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